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of Padua, Padua, Italy
The temporal relationship between our conscious intentions to act and the action itself
has been widely investigated. Previous research consistently shows that the motor
intention enters awareness a few 100 ms before movement onset. As research in other
domains has shown that most behavior is affected by the emotional state people are
in, it is remarkable that the role of emotional states on intention awareness has never
been investigated. Here we tested the hypothesis that positive and negative affects have
opposite effects on the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and
the action itself. A mood induction procedure that combined guided imagery and music
listening was employed to induce positive, negative, or neutral affective states. After
each mood induction session, participants were asked to execute voluntary self-paced
movements and to report when they formed the intention to act. Exposure to pleasant
material, as compared to exposure to unpleasant material, enhanced positive affect
and dampened negative affect. Importantly, in the positive affect condition participants
reported their intention to act earlier in time with respect to action onset, as compared
to when they were in the negative or in the neutral affect conditions. Conversely the
reported time of the intention to act when participants experienced negative affect
did not differ significantly from the neutral condition. These findings suggest that the
temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself is
malleable to changes in affective states and may indicate that positive affect enhances
intentional awareness.
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Introduction
A key feature of voluntary movements is the conscious experience of the intention to act,
which can be described as the feeling that we are planning to do something (Haggard, 2005).
Previous research in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience mainly focused on
the so-called motor intention, on its temporal relationship to movement execution and to
related brain potentials (for a review see Haggard, 2008). In the pioneering study of Libet et al.
(1983), participants had to perform simple self-paced manual movements while watching a
rotating clock hand that was displayed on a screen. After executing the movement, they were
asked to report, by using the clock hand, when they felt the ﬁrst urge or intention to execute
the movement, the so-called W-moment. It was found that intentions were reported by the
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subjects ∼200 ms before the onset of the actual movement,
and up to ∼2 s after the onset of movement-related brain
potentials, such as the readiness potential (Shibasaki and Hallett,
2006). Although both the validity of the W-moment as a reliable
measure of the timing of the intention and the interpretation
of the readiness potential as reﬂecting motor preparation have
been criticized (Gomes, 1998; Trevena andMiller, 2010; Schurger
et al., 2012), following studies have replicated the main ﬁnding
(Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Soon et al., 2008; Rigoni et al., 2013).
For instance, Haggard and Eimer (1999) provided evidence that
the W-moment is linked to the lateralized readiness potential,
which reﬂects activity over motor areas – including primary
motor cortex – contralateral to the responding hand. More
recently, it was found that the W-moment is often reported after
muscular activation of the responding hand (Rigoni et al., 2013).
These observations have been taken as evidence that awareness
of a motor intention, as measured during the Libet task, is
a latecomer during movement preparation and execution. The
conscious intention to act would reﬂect the moment at which
people become aware that they are about to execute a voluntary
movement, rather than the ‘driving force’ of our actions (Hallett,
2007). Awareness of the motor intention presumably arises when
neural activity in speciﬁc brain circuits – including the premotor
cortex, the supplementary motor areas, and the posterior parietal
cortex (Lau et al., 2004; Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009) – exceeds
an individual’s threshold level, and therefore only after speciﬁc
movement-related brain processes occurred unconsciously.
While previous studies shed lights on neural (Libet et al., 1983;
Lau et al., 2004, 2007; Rigoni et al., 2013) and psychological
(Banks and Isham, 2009; Rigoni et al., 2010) determinants of
intention awareness, little is known about the impact of diﬀerent
aﬀective states on intention awareness. Yet human actions are
almost always accompanied by speciﬁc moods or emotions: a
child is likely to feel happy and excited while grasping his or
her favorite chocolate bar; conversely, we probably feel angry and
frustrated while grasping the phone to inform our colleagues that
we will be late for the scheduled meeting because of a traﬃc
jam. In some extreme circumstances, very intense emotional
experiences can also have an impact on the experience of
conscious control one has over one’s own behavior. For instance,
in the so-called ‘crime of passion,’ the perpetrator commits a
violent act, like a murder, against someone because of a sudden
and strong rage or heartbreak. The use of this type of crime
as a defendant’s excuse for committing the crime was recently
restored in the UK (Whitehead and Hough, 2012) based on the
argument that, in such circumstances, actions can be considered
to be un-intentional because they are characterized by the
experience of a temporary loss of conscious control.
The link between intentional control and aﬀective state
was recently investigated in a study of Aarts et al. (2012). In
this study, evidence was found that sense of agency, which
is the subjective experience of controlling one’s actions and
their subsequent eﬀects, is stronger when positive emotional
pictures were presented. Conversely, the sense of agency is
reduced for actions resulting in negative emotional outcomes
(Yoshie and Haggard, 2013). This suggests that subjective
experiences surrounding intentional control can be modulated
by aﬀective stimuli. However, besides anecdotic observations, to
our knowledge, no studies have directly investigated the impact
of positive or negative aﬀective states on intention awareness.
A large body of literature already indicated that positive
and negative aﬀective states have opposite eﬀects on diﬀerent
levels of cognitive processing. In a nutshell, diﬀerent theories
have suggested that positive aﬀect has a broadening function
for cognition, whereas negative aﬀect is supposed to narrow
cognitive processes (Easterbrook, 1959; Derryberry and Tucker,
1994; Fredrickson, 2001, 2004). Positive aﬀect has been shown
to enhance ﬂexibility in problem solving (Isen et al., 1987) and
to expand the scope of semantic memory in word association
tasks (Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen et al., 1985; Ashby
et al., 1999). These broadening eﬀects of positive aﬀect have
been suggested to originate from changes in for more basic
cognitive functions, such as selective attention (Rowe et al., 2007).
For instance, Rowe et al. (2007) induced aﬀective changes in
their participants by means of pleasant and unpleasant music.
Then participants performed the Flanker task, an experimental
paradigm requiring participants to focus on a central target and
ignore the irrelevant ﬂankers presented laterally. They found
that positive aﬀect inﬂuenced the ability to selectively focus
on the target by increasing the processing of the spatially
distant ﬂanking distracters. Although this observation suggests a
detrimental eﬀect of positive aﬀect for tasks requiring a narrow
and focused selective visual attention, they are consistent with
the hypothesis that positive aﬀect increases the breadth of the
attentional focus (Fenske and Eastwood, 2003; Rowe et al., 2007).
However, while aﬀect-related changes in attention have been
reported elsewhere (e.g., Chajut and Algom, 2003; Grol et al.,
2014) this eﬀect was not always replicated with other conﬂict-
tasks (Martin and Kerns, 2011; van Steenbergen et al., 2011;
Bruyneel et al., 2013). Further research has shown that positive
aﬀect can also reduce ‘attentional blink’ – i.e., the inability to
detect a stimulus presented in a sequence when this is presented
shortly after the previous stimulus – by increasing attention
resources (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2014). In addition, Soto
et al. (2009) found that positive aﬀect induced by listening to
pleasant music, enhanced visual awareness in patients with visual
neglect, suggesting that positive aﬀect can decrease visual neglect
by increasing attentional resources to the external space.
The studies described above suggest that positive aﬀect, as
compared to negative aﬀect, broadens awareness by enhancing
the allocation of attentional resources to both internal (e.g.,
semantic memory) and external stimuli. Whether positive aﬀect
can also impact on the awareness of inner states during the
execution of intentional actions has never been investigated
directly. Partial support for the hypothesis that intention
awareness can be modulated by the valence of individuals’
aﬀective state comes from a recent study on expert meditators
(Jo et al., 2015). Meditation is a psychological state that
is known to decrease negative aﬀect, such as anxiety, and
simultaneously increase positive aﬀect (Davidson et al., 2003).
Jo et al. (2015) employed the Libet’s task to investigate whether
meditation leads to changes in intention awareness, and found
that motor intentions were reported earlier in time in meditators
as compared to non-meditators. This observation was taken
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as evidence that meditators are more capable to access inner
processes underlying the initiation of a voluntary movement
(Jo et al., 2015). It should be noted, however, that aﬀect or mood
were not directly manipulated in Jo et al. (2015) study, and thus
the question whether aﬀective states alone impact on intention
awareness remains unanswered.
In the current study, we wanted to investigate whether
diﬀerent aﬀects can inﬂuence awareness of inner motor states,
such as when we attend to our own motor intentions. If positive
aﬀect broadens the scope of attention by enhancing attentional
resources, the motor intention should be detected earlier in
time when individuals experience positive aﬀect as compared to
when they experience negative aﬀect. To test this hypothesis, a
previously validated mood induction procedure (Mayer et al.,
1995) was employed to trigger temporarily positive, neutral, or
negative aﬀective states in a group of healthy participants. After
each mood induction session, participants performed the Libet
task (Libet et al., 1983), where they were asked to attend to
their own intentions and report when they formed the conscious
intention to perform the movement. Our speciﬁc hypothesis
was that, as compared to negative aﬀect, positive aﬀect should
broaden intention awareness, and this should be reﬂected in
earlier access to internal states related to movement preparation
(Ganos et al., 2014).
Materials and Methods
Experimental Design
The study included a full within-subjects experimental design
with the type of induced mood (Positive, Negative, and Neutral)
as within-subjects variable. The eﬀect of each mood induction
was checked by means of a Dutch version of a 16-items adjective
scale (Mayer et al., 1995; see below for more details). The reported
time of conscious intention (i.e., W-moment) during the Libet
task was entered as dependent variable in the analyses.
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students of Ghent University (20
females, 12 males), aged 18–30 years (M = 19.81) participated
to the experiment in exchange of course credits. Six left-handed
participants took part to the experiment and carried out the
main task with their dominant hand (see Experiment Description
below). Participants had no previous neurological or psychiatric
history, and they had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Informed consents were obtained prior the experiment. The
study was conducted according to the Declaration ofHelsinki and
was approved by the local ethic committee.
Experimental Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment, participants received detailed
instructions about the experimental procedure as well as about
the Libet task (Libet et al., 1983). After practicing the Libet
task (i.e., ﬁve trials), a baseline measurement of each individual’s
aﬀective state was assessed by means of a Dutch version of a 16-
items adjective scale (Mayer et al., 1995) for happiness (cheerful,
happy, lively, joyful), anger (angry, furious, mad, hostile), fear
(scared, fearful, afraid, nervous), and sadness (blue, depressed,
unhappy, sad). Each of the 16 adjectives was responded to on
a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = deﬁnitely do not feel
to 4 = deﬁnitely feel. The experiment included three mood
induction sessions, each followed by a self-report measurement
of participants’ aﬀective states (Mayer et al., 1995) and the Libet
task. After performing the Libet task, participants were given
2 min to try to get their aﬀective state back to normal. Each
mood induction session lasted 4 min and combined a guided
imagery and a music procedure to induce positive, negative, or
neutral aﬀective state. The order of the mood induction session
was randomized across participants. Stimuli presentation and
response collection were controlled by E-Prime 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools, 2013). The experimental session
lasted about 1 h.
Mood Induction
We combined a guided imagery and a music procedure to induce
positive, negative, and neutral aﬀective states in each participant
(Mayer et al., 1995; Mitchell and Phillips, 2007; Robinson et al.,
2012). For eachmood induction session, participants were shown
a series of eight scenarios that remained on the screen for 30 s.
They were instructed to get into the mood suggested by the
scenarios and relate them to situations in their own life. They
were also encouraged to display outwardly the emotions evoked
and to get as deeply into the emotion as possible. While reading
the sentences, participants wore around-ear headphones and
listened to a music track that was previously selected to induce
positive, negative, or neutral aﬀective state. To induce positive
and negative aﬀective states, we employed the happiness- and
anger-inducing scenarios used in Mayer et al. (1995) study and
translated into Dutch. Positive scenarios were presented as light
red text on a yellow background and were meant to induce
pleasant emotions such as happiness (e.g. “It’s your birthday and
friends throw you a terriﬁc surprise party,” “You wake up on
a Saturday after a number of wintry-cold rainy days, and the
temperature is in the high sixties.”). Conversely, negative scenarios
were presented as light gray text on a dark blue background
and were meant to induce unpleasant emotions, such as anger
(e.g., “Somebody ﬁles a false legal claim against you,” “A student
stole the exam in an important course you’re taking. The professor
takes it out on everyone by making such a tough exam that you
get a very low grade even though you understood the material.”).
Neutral scenarios (Velten, 1968) featured black text on a white
background and were assumed to induce neither positive nor
negative aﬀective states (e.g., “The Paciﬁc Ocean has ﬁsh,” “The
Appalachian Highlands are worn down mountains and plateaus
stretching from the northern Alabama to the St. Lawrence River
in Canada.”). While reading the positive scenarios participants
listened to ‘A little night music’ by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart.
Conversely, while reading the negative scenarios they listened
to ‘Night on bald Mountain’ by Modest Mussorgski. These two
music tracks have been used previously to induce positive and
negative aﬀective states, respectively (Vastfjall, 2002; Robinson
et al., 2012). While reading the neutral scenarios participants
listened to ‘Neptune’ by Gustav Holst (Vastfjall, 2002; Robinson
et al., 2012).
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Libet Task
Participants performed 30 trials of the Libet task (Libet et al.,
1983) after eachmood induction session, for a total of 90 trials. At
the beginning of each trial a cursor appeared at a random position
around a clock face and started to rotate clockwise around the
clock, completing one full rotation in 2540 ms. The clock was
40mm in diameter and was composed by 60 evenly spaced yellow
spots on a black background. For all the duration of the task
participants were asked to ﬁxate the center of the clock – i.e., a
light blue cross – and to rest the index ﬁnger of their dominant
hand on the response button, which was the keyboard spacebar.
They were encouraged to press the button spontaneously and
suddenly at a time of their own choosing, following at least half
rotation of the cursor. They were asked not to pre-plan the time
of the button press and were told that they could choose not
to make a button press in any trial. After the button press the
cursor continued rotating for a random interval between 800 and
1500 ms and then stopped. At that time participants were to act
on the mouse with their non-dominant hand and click at the
“time” (i.e., exact position on the clock) when they formed the
intention or decision to respond – e.g., the time at which they
decided “to press the button now” (i.e., W-moment).
Data Analysis and Statistics
Trials of the Libet task where participants provided no response
or where they did not wait for half rotation of the clock – i.e.,
1270 ms – before pressing the button were discarded from data
analysis (12.4% of total trials). Three participants were excluded
from further analyses because of the high rejection rate – i.e.,
more than 66% rejected trials in at least one experimental
condition. Analyses were therefore conducted on the remaining
29 participants. The eﬀect of the mood induction on intention
awareness was tested by means of a repeated measure ANOVA
with the type of mood induction (Positive, Neutral, Negative)
as within subjects’ factor and the W-moment as dependent
variable.
To quantify whether mood induction sessions were eﬀective in
changing participants’ aﬀective state, scores to each subscale (i.e.,
anger, fear, happiness, sadness) after each mood induction were
compared to the respective baseline with paired comparisons. In
addition, we also examined whether the diﬀerent mood induction
procedures led to diﬀerent aﬀective states by conducting four
separate repeated measure ANCOVAs with each adjective scale
as dependent variable and with the type of mood induction as
within-subjects factor. For each analysis the baseline score to the
relevant adjective scale was entered as covariate to control for
possible diﬀerences in the baseline aﬀective state.
For each analysis, Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used
for sphericity, and the Bonferroni–Holm’s sequential correction
for multiple comparisons was applied to the post hoc tests (Holm,
1979).
Results
Mood Induction Check
Paired comparisons between the baseline score and the score after
each mood induction for each subscale are reported in Table 1.
As compared to the baseline score, the induction of positive
aﬀect improved feelings of happiness, and at the same time
reduced negative emotions such as fear and sadness. Conversely,
the procedure employed to induce negative aﬀect eﬀectively
TABLE 1 | Mean scores and SDs to the four subscales measuring anger, fear, happiness, and sadness, at the beginning of the experiment – i.e.,
baseline – as well as after each mood induction – i.e., positive, neutral, and negative.
Baseline Mood induction
Positive Neutral Negative
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Anger 1.29 (0.56) 1.03 (0.11) t(28) = 2.64
p = 0.013
1.18 (0.33) t(28) = 1.11
p = 0.28
2.67 (1.04) t(28)=−6.05
p < 0.0001
Cohen’s
d = –1.16
Fear 1.72 (0.58) 1.22 (0.3) t(28) = 4.82
p < 0.0001
Cohen’s
d = 0.97
1.62 (0.87) 0.56, 0.58 2.05 (0.92) –1.78, 0.086
Happiness 3.31 (0.77) 4 (0.72) t(28)=−4.46
p < 0.0001
Cohen’s
d = –0.83
2.77 (0.91) t(28) = 3.47
p = 0.002
Cohen’s
d = 0.65
2.28 (0.72) t(28) = 6.63
p < 0.0001
Cohen’s
d = 1.24
Sadness 1.49 (0.68) 1.16 (0.31) t(28) = 3.65
p = 0.001
Cohen’s
d = 0.94
1.33 (0.56) t(28) = 1.31
p = 0.2
2 (0.89) t(28) = –4.24
p < 0.0001
Cohen’s
d = –0.83
The t and p values refer to paired comparisons between the corresponding condition and the baseline level for the same subscale. For comparisons that were significant
after the Bonferroni–Holm’s sequential correction (in bold), Cohen’s d is also reported.
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increased negative emotions such as anger and sadness, and
simultaneously decreased positive emotions such as happiness.
Although the material used in the neutral condition was not
meant to induce positive or positive emotions, we observed a
signiﬁcant attenuation of happiness in this condition, indicating
that the stimulus material used in the neutral condition may not
be emotionally neutral and may be perceived by participants as
unpleasant. Conversely, no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the neutral mood
induction were observed on the subscales measuring negative
emotions.
While these observations indicate that the mood induction
procedure eﬀectively changed participants’ aﬀective state, we
also tested whether the reported aﬀective state changed across
conditions. The analyses revealed a main eﬀect of the type of
mood induction for the anger [F(2,54) = 14.51, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.35] and the happiness [F(2,54) = 5.79, p = 0.009,
η2p = 0.18] subscales (see Figure 1). Planned comparisons
indicated that participants scored higher on the anger subscale
in the Negative condition (2.67 ± 1.03) as compared to both
the Neutral (1.18 ± 0.33, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.51) and the
Positive condition (1.03 ± 0.11, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.15).
As for the happiness subscale, participants scored higher in
the Positive condition (4 ± 0.72) as compared to the Neutral
(2.76 ± 0.91, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.81) and the Negative
condition (2.28 ± 0.72, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.85). Scores to
the happiness subscale were also higher in the Neutral than in
the Negative condition (p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = 0.72). No main
eﬀect of condition was found on self-report measures of fear and
sadness (all ps > 0.1).
Taken together, these observations indicate that both the
Positive and the Negative mood inductions were eﬀective in
changing participants’ aﬀective states. These changes were
qualiﬁed as increased positive emotions (i.e., happiness)
and reduced negative emotions (i.e., fear, sadness) after the
positive mood induction. Conversely, the negative mood
induction increased negative aﬀect (i.e., anger, sadness) while
simultaneously decreasing positive aﬀect.
Awareness of Intention
The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the type of mood
induction [F(1.51,42.14) = 3.63, p = 0.047, η2p = 0.115],
indicating that the W-moment varied across the experiment as
function of the experimental condition. This eﬀect was qualiﬁed
by a signiﬁcant linear trend, as revealed by signiﬁcant linear
contrasts analysis [F(1,28) = 4.66, p = 0.04, η2p = 0.143],
indicating a linear decrease of the W-moment across the three
experimental conditions (see Figure 2). Planned comparisons
revealed that W-moment were reported signiﬁcantly earlier in
time in the positive condition (361.42 ms ± 361.2) as compared
to the neutral condition [261.24 ms ± 266.88; t(28) = 2.94, one-
tailed p = 0.003; Cohen’s d = 0.32] as well as to the negative
condition [231.2 ms ± 234.95; t(28) = 2.16, one-tailed p = 0.02;
Cohen’s d= 0.43]. Conversely,W-moment did not diﬀer between
the negative and the neutral condition (p = 0.58).
We also wanted to test whether the induced aﬀective states
inﬂuenced the response time (RT) – i.e., the time interval
between the onset of the trial and the participant’s button press –
FIGURE 1 | Self-report scores to the adjective scales measuring anger,
fear, happiness, and sadness after the positive, the neutral, and the
negative mood inductions. (∗∗p < 0.01).
FIGURE 2 | Reported time (in milliseconds) of intention in relation to
the button press – i.e., time 0. Error bars indicate the SEM. (∗p < 0.05;
∗∗p < 0.01).
a repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted with condition
as within-subjects variable and the individual averaged RT as
dependent variable. The analysis revealed no eﬀects of condition
(p = 0.36).
Discussion
The present study examined whether positive and negative
aﬀective states can impact on participants’ attention toward inner
states of voluntary movement initiation. The mood induction
procedure employed here eﬀectively modulated participants’
aﬀective state as measured by self-report adjective scales (see
Table 1; Figure 1). Overall, participants reported more positive
aﬀect after being exposed to pleasant material and reported more
negative aﬀect after being exposed to unpleasant material. After
each mood induction procedure participants were to perform the
Libet task (Libet et al., 1983). In this task participants are asked to
press a button at the time of their own choice and to report when
they formed the intention to press the button. In line with our
prediction, the intention to act was reported earlier in time – as
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indicated by the W-moment – after participants were primed
with pleasant material as compared to when they were primed
with unpleasant or neutral material (see Figure 2).
These results corroborate previous evidence that mood
induction procedures combining guided imagery and music is
an eﬀective method to temporarily inﬂuence people’s aﬀective
states (Mayer et al., 1995; Vastfjall, 2002; Robinson et al., 2012).
Exposure to pleasant auditory and written material eﬀectively
increased positive emotions, such as happiness, and decreased
negative emotions such as sadness and fear, as compared to the
pre-experiment aﬀective state. Conversely, after being primed
with unpleasant music and scenarios, participants reported more
negative emotions such as anger and sadness and less happiness,
as compared to a baseline level (see Table 1). Crucially, the
patterns of reported emotions were considerably diﬀerent after
each mood induction session (see Figure 1). More precisely, the
diﬀerent types of mood induction led to diﬀerences in speciﬁc
emotions, such as happiness and anger, while other emotions,
such as sadness and fear, were comparable across conditions.
This observation is in line with previous studies using the same
pleasant and unpleasant stimulus material to speciﬁcally induce
happiness and anger, respectively (Mayer et al., 1995). Since
happiness and anger are similar in arousal but opposite to each
other in valence (Russell, 1980; Posner et al., 2005), one can
reasonably argue that the eﬀects of the mood manipulation on
intention awareness is driven by an increase of pleasant emotions
in the Positive condition as compared to the Negative and the
Neutral condition. However, it should be noted that anger and
happiness also diﬀer in motivational dimensions, with anger-
related emotions being higher in approach motivation (Posner
et al., 2005; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008) as compared to
happiness. It is therefore possible that the changes in intention
awareness reported here may be inﬂuenced also by motivational
factors related to the approach-avoidance dimension, which was
not controlled for in the current study.
These results are in line with our prediction that aﬀective
states can modulate intention awareness. Inducing positive mood
leads to earlier W-judgments, which may reﬂect a broadening of
the selective attention to inner states. Conversely, our prediction
that negative aﬀect would narrow intention awareness was
not supported by the data. The reported time of intentions
when participants were primed with anger-inducing material
did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the neutral condition, that
is, when participants were exposed to scenarios and music
that was supposed to evoke neither positive nor negative
aﬀective states. However, it should be noted that participants
reported a reduction in positive aﬀect after the neutral induction
(Table 1), indicating that the neutral condition elicited some
emotional changes. Other control conditions (e.g., a diﬀerent
set of scenarios, diﬀerent music, or neither scenarios nor music
at all) might have garnered diﬀerent results. Further research
should therefore employ control conditions that allow for a clear
distinction between neutral/baseline and negative mood.
These ﬁndings provide ﬁrst evidence that aﬀective states can
inﬂuence intention awareness. One plausible interpretation of
these ﬁndings is that positive aﬀect, as compared to negative
aﬀect, enhances awareness of inner states related to action
preparation and initiation, as measured by the W-judgment.
Previous empirical studies showed that W-judgments can be
modulated by a variety of factors, including neurological
conditions, such as Parkinson’s disease (Tabu et al., 2015),
tic disorder (Ganos et al., 2014), and lesions in the parietal
cortex (Sirigu et al., 2004), stimulation of supplementary motor
areas (Lau et al., 2007), and manipulations of the experimental
stimuli, such as delayed sensory feedbacks (Banks and Isham,
2009; Rigoni et al., 2010). Here we show that W-judgments
in healthy participants were modulated by a mood induction
procedure designed to temporarily change participants’ aﬀective
state, suggesting that intention awareness is sensitive to people’s
current emotional or mood state. In a way, this ﬁnding can be
seen as an extension of previous ﬁndings (Aarts et al., 2012;
Yoshie and Haggard, 2013) where it was shown that another
component of intentional control, namely the sense of agency,
was inﬂuenced in a similar way by positive aﬀect. States of
positive aﬀects seem to boost the feeling of intentional control,
as indicated by increased sense of agency (Aarts et al., 2012;
Yoshie and Haggard, 2013) and by enhanced intention awarenss,
as observed here and in previous studies (Jo et al., 2015).
The interpretation of the observed eﬀects in terms of
increased awareness critically relies on the assumption that the
W-judgment is a valid marker of awareness of inner motor
states. However, this assumption is still greatly debated (Gomes,
1998; Pockett, 2002; Banks and Isham, 2009). For instance, it
is not possible to exclude that the mood induction aﬀected
participants’ implicit or explicit strategies to judge the time
of their conscious decisions, rather than intention awareness
itself. One alternative interpretation is that the induction of a
positive mood increased visual awareness, which in turn may
have impacted on the post hoc estimation of the time of the
conscious intention when participants were to report the position
of the dot on the clock. Given the subjective nature of the Libet
task and of the W-judgment, it is not possible to exclude this
alternative interpretation with the current data.
Our observation that positive aﬀect leads to earlier awareness
of intention is in line with a series of empirical studies showing
that positive aﬀect improves action control by boosting dopamine
level in the brain (Ashby et al., 1999; Braver and Cohen, 2000;
Cohen et al., 2002; Dreisbach, 2006). More precisely, it has been
suggested that positive aﬀect modulates cognitive control and
cognitive ﬂexibility by increasing the neurotransmitter dopamine
in speciﬁc brain regions, namely in the striatum and the
prefrontal cortex (Ashby et al., 1999). More recently, Cools et al.
(2001, 2007) and Cools (2008) provided a reﬁned version of this
account by showing that the neural structure in which dopamine
levels are sensitive to positive aﬀect are indeed involved in
the modulation of cognitive control. They reported evidence
that increased dopamine in the striatum increased cognitive
ﬂexibility, while increased dopamine in the prefrontal cortex
leads less distraction by irrelevant information. Interestingly,
a recent study provides indirect evidence that the levels of
dopamine do not only inﬂuence cognitive control, but also aﬀect
intention awareness (Tabu et al., 2015). By employing a modiﬁed
version of the Libet task, the authors compared the reported
time of the conscious intention in Parkinson’s patients without
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medication – therefore with dopamine depletion – with healthy
participants, and found delayed intention awareness in those
patients. While the Libet task employed here does not directly
measure cognitive control, empirical evidence suggests that
enhanced intention awareness is indeed associated with higher
cognitive control. For instance, Ganos et al. (2014) found that tic
patients with a higher ability to voluntarily control and suppress
their tics also reported signiﬁcantly earlier intention awareness,
indicating that early detection of one’s motor states may indeed
contribute to voluntary action control. On the one hand, the
ﬁnding that positive aﬀect leads to earlier intention awareness
would therefore be in line with a neurophysiological account
predicting increased dopamine level in relevant areas of the
prefrontal cortex that are known to be crucial for volitional action
control, such as the supplementary motor areas (Jenkins et al.,
1992; Mattay et al., 2002; Lau et al., 2004). On the other hand,
this observation may also have implications for conscious control
of behavior (Libet, 1999). According to Libet (1999), although
voluntary actions are initiated unconsciously – as indicated by
the early onset of motor-related brain potentials – the individual
can still modify or inhibit the action once movement preparation
reaches awareness (Libet, 1999, 2006). This capacity to veto the
action, referred to as free won’t (Obhi and Haggard, 2004), would
be the crucial function of our “conscious will” (Libet, 1999). Our
ﬁnding would therefore imply that positive aﬀect may provide
additional time to the conscious will to modify the action, by
widening the temporal interval between the moment at which we
become aware of movement initiation and the actual movement.
However, as described previously, the limitations of the Libet
method for the investigation of the conscious intention call
for a cautious interpretation of our data in terms of enhanced
awareness and conscious control.
While we provide evidence that positive aﬀect inﬂuences
awareness of motor intentions, our hypothesis that negative
aﬀect would narrow attentional breadth toward inner intentional
states was not conﬁrmed by our data. There are, in our view,
two plausible explanations that may account for this lack of
eﬀect of negative mood on intention awareness. One possibility
is that the mood induction procedure was less eﬀective in
triggering negative aﬀect as it was in triggering positive aﬀect.
Although self-report data indicate that the mood induction
procedure indeed increased anger-related aﬀect, it is possible
that mood induction manipulation was not strong enough to
aﬀect neurocognitive processes underlying intention awareness.
An alternative interpretation is that brain processes that
underlie intention awareness are not sensitive to negative mood
manipulations. While positive aﬀect is assumed to inﬂuence
cognition – and executive functions more speciﬁcally – mainly
by increasing dopamine levels in the brain (Ashby et al., 1999,
2002; Fredrickson, 2004; Mitchell and Phillips, 2007), the impact
of negative mood on the same cognitive functions is much less
deﬁned. More precisely, the eﬀect of negative aﬀect is likely to
be mediated by diﬀerent neurotransmitters as compared to those
involved in positive aﬀect, such as serotonin levels, that have only
little impact on executive functions (for a review see Mitchell and
Phillips, 2007). It is therefore possible that intention awareness,
as measured by the Libet task, is relatively unrelated to changes
in serotonin level due to negative mood induction.
Conclusion
This study was the ﬁrst to show that intentional awareness
is inﬂuenced by the aﬀective state participants are in. Our
observations nicely ﬁt with the idea that positive emotional
states broadens selective attention and adds to it that it can
redirect participants’ attention toward inner states of voluntary
movement initiation. However, given the limitations of the
Libet task, the interpretation of our data in terms of increased
intentional awareness should be taken with caution. Further
research should therefore provide converging evidence that
positive aﬀect, as compared to neutral or negative emotions,
enhances intentional action control by employing diﬀerent tasks
and paradigms. In addition, future studies should investigate
how intention awareness is inﬂuenced by diﬀerent types of both
positive and negative emotions while controlling for valence,
arousal, and other motivational dimensions such as approach and
withdrawal. In our opinion, this line of research would crucially
elucidate how conscious control is linked to speciﬁc emotional
states or moods, and would therefore be of relevance for several
domains, such as health and clinical psychology as well as for
forensic settings.
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